Chilcot: Key findings of the UK’s Iraq War report

"In the Inquiry’s view, the diplomatic options had not at that stage [March 2003] been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort."

" Mr Blair’s long Note of 28 July, telling President Bush “I will be with you, whatever,” was seen, before it was sent, only by No. 10 officials ... While the Note was marked “Personal” (to signal that it should have a restricted circulation), it represented an extensive statement of the UK Government’s position by the Prime Minister to the President of the United States. The Foreign and Defence Secretaries should certainly have been given an opportunity to comment on the draft in advance. "

"The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory."

"When he saw the draft paper on WMD countries of concern on 8 March, Mr Straw commented: “Good, but should not Iraq be first and also have more text? The paper has to show why there is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this yet.”"

"The lack of evidence to support pre‑conflict claims about Iraq’s WMD challenged the credibility of the Government and the intelligence community, and the legitimacy of the war."

"Concern that vital areas of co-operation between the UK and the US could be damaged if the UK did not give the US its full support over Iraq; the belief that the best way to influence US policy towards the direction preferred by the UK was to commit full and unqualified support, and seek to persuade from the inside."

"The declared objectives of the UK and the US towards Iraq up to the time of the invasion differed. The US was explicitly seeking to achieve a change of regime; the UK to achieve the disarmament of Iraq, as required by UN Security Council resolutions."

"Mr Blair had been advised that an invasion of Iraq was expected to increase the threat to the UK and UK interests from Al Qaida and its affiliates."

"UK planning and preparation for the post‑conflict phase of operations, which rested on the assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its military presence in Iraq and deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were wholly inadequate. "

"The achievements made in preparing the forces in the time available were very considerable, but the deployment of forces more quickly than anticipated in the Defence Planning Assumptions meant that there were some serious equipment shortfalls when conflict began."

"In November 2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had played no role in the 9/11 attacks on the US and that practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was “unlikely”. There was no “credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups”. It was possible that Iraq might use WMD in terrorist attacks, but only if the regime was under serious and imminent threat of collapse."

"… After the invasion, the UK Government, including the intelligence community, was reluctant to admit, and to recognise publicly, the mounting evidence that there had been failings in the UK’s pre‑conflict collection, validation, analysis and presentation of intelligence on Iraq’s WMD."